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INTRODUCTION
Precedence is the guiding principle of American jurisprudence.' It is
the foundational element of common law.2 This adherence to past deci-
sions, eloquently titled stare decisis, "promotes the evenhanded, predict-
able, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
1. See, e.g., Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987)
("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.") (italics in origi-
nal).
2. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 367 (1988)
("[R]eliance on precedent is one of the distinctive features of the American judicial system.").
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judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of
the judicial process."3 However, stare decisis is not without its downfalls,
particularly its inherent inflexibility. Inflexible adherence to outdated
precedent can cause unjust outcomes, and there are limited ways to re-
move a precedent once it is in place-either the Supreme Court can over-
rule itself;4 the legislature can write legislation nullifying the precedent;
or, in constitutional cases, the Constitution can be amended.6
Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl involves the application of
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to Colorado's efforts to improve
use tax collection on sales by out-of-state retailers.8 While taxation under
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is a unique issue, this case re-
veals a more systemic issue. Using the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Direct
Marketing Association, this Case Comment will argue that increasingly
rapid change and a failure of the legislative check may begin to hinder
the effectiveness of stare decisis. By chipping away at precedent that it
cannot overturn, courts create a sea of "precedential islands," 9 or cases
that are binding only on their exact factual scenarios. If more and more
precedential islands arise, judicial decisions may become less predictable
and consistent, thus decreasing judicial efficiency and increasing the
number of possible traps for future courts and legal professionals to fall
into.
Part I of this Comment gives a brief background of the underlying
legal issue in this case-the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and its
applicability to taxation-as well as an overview of how precedent is
removed in our system of government. Next, Part II summarizes the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Direct Marketing Association. Finally,
Part III utilizes the Tenth Circuit's distinction between Quill Corp. v.
North Dakotao and Direct Marketing Association as an example of how
a precedential island forms and discusses why these islands may increase
in number and the possible implications of their proliferation: namely,
the weakening of stare decisis.
3. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Minturn v. Maynard, 58 U.S. 477 (1854), overruled by Exxon Corp. v. Cent.
Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, (1991).
5. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by
statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
6. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by constitutional amend-
ment, U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
7. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl (Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV), 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016).
8. Id. at 1132.
9. Id. at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
10. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Direct Marketing Association's (DMA) claim before the Tenth Cir-
cuit is rooted in the dormant Commerce Clause, specifically in its ap-
plicability to state taxation." The dormant Commerce Clause is not writ-
ten into the Constitution, but derives from the Commerce Clause itself.12
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the ultimate power to regulate
interstate commerce; even though state and local governments can pass
legislation regulating commerce, those governments can do nothing to
stop Congress from preempting that legislation if it so chooses." The
notion of commerce, as well as commerce itself, has grown dramatically
since the Constitution's drafting, prompting the judicial creation of the
dormant (or negative) Commerce Clause doctrine in the early 1800s. 14
The doctrine arises from the idea that a grant of interstate commerce
power to Congress implies a restriction of interstate commerce power on
the states.'5 Therefore, if a state enacts a law or regulation that discrimi-
nates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce, the judiciary will
use the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to invalidate the action.'6
"The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit
state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism,
laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Con-
stitution was designed to prevent."7
When applying a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the focus is
on "whether a state law improperly interferes with interstate com-
merce."" There are two ways a state law can interfere with interstate
commerce: (1) by discriminating against interstate commerce or (2) by
unduly burdening interstate commerce.19 A state law that discriminates
must pass the strictest scrutiny, only surviving if the state can show that
the law "advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives."20 A state law that
burdens interstate commerce will only be invalidated if the burden im-
posed on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the local benefits of the
law .21
11. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1132.
12. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 455-56 (4th ed. 2013).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1135.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1136.
17. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
18. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1135.
19. Id. at 1136.





B. Colorado Sales and Use Taxes
Colorado has utilized sales and use taxes as a means of generating
revenue since the mid-1930s.22 Colorado residents are required to pay
either sales tax or use tax on their purchases, but not both.23 "A sales tax
is imposed on retail transactions or purchases that occur within [Colora-
do] .,,24 The Colorado Department of Revenue requires in-state retailers to
25calculate, collect, and remit sales tax. Consequently, Coloradans are
accustomed to paying sales tax-the state has a 98.3% sales tax compli-
ance rate.26
Use tax, however, is slightly different. "A 'use' tax, sometimes re-
ferred to as a 'compensating' tax, taxes the privilege of using, storing, or
otherwise consuming tangible personal property or services, usually at a
rate equivalent to the sales tax."27 "A use tax is designed to protect a
state's revenues by taking away the advantages to residents of traveling
out of state to make untaxed purchases and to protect local merchants
from out-of-state competition which, because of its lower or nonexistent
tax burdens, can offer lower prices.,2 8 For example, a Colorado resident
purchasing a $2,000 computer in Delaware, which has no sales tax,
would save himself approximately $175 in sales tax. However, the way
the tax system is set up, he would owe an equivalent use tax to the Colo-
rado Department of Revenue. Generally, the requirement of calculating
and remitting these use taxes falls to the purchaser.29 The combination of
these two taxes is meant to create a steady stream of revenue from all
purchases made by Colorado residents, regardless of where the purchase
occurred.30 Nevertheless, even though they are legally required to do so,
most Coloradans do not pay their use taxes3 -the state has a 4% use tax
compliance rate.32
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Taxation
Over the past fifty years, jurisprudence specific to taxation under
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has developed.33 The Court ar-
22. Id. at 1132.
23. Id.
24. 67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 1 (2017).
25. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-26-101 to -129 (2016) (codification ofColorado's sales tax
collection and remittance scheme).
26. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1132 n.1L
27. Sales and Use Taxes, supra note 24, § 134.
28. Id.
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-204(l)(a). There are a few instances when the collection of use
tax falls to the retailer, but they are the exception. Id § 39-26-204(2). Additionally, the use tax on
items that the state requires to be registered, such as cars, is usually paid at the time of registration.
See id. § 39-26-113.
30. See Sales and Use Taxes, supra note 24, § 134.
31. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1132.
32. Id. at 1132 n.1.
33. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756-57 (1967); see also
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977).
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ticulated a framework in 1977,34 holding that a tax on an out-of-state
entity will be upheld if it "[1] is applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the ser-
vices provided by the State."3 5 The "substantial nexus" requirement is
minimal "and is established if the taxed entity 'avails itself of the sub-
stantial privilege of carrying on business within the State,' but the Court
has held that an entity lacking a physical presence within a state but
mailing goods into it from outside is not connected to the state by such a
nexus."36
The "physical presence" requirement was expressed in 1967, prior
to the establishment of the modem framework. The Supreme Court, in
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,37 addressed wheth-
er Illinois could require a Delaware-based mail-order business with no
physical presence in Illinois to collect and remit use taxes on sales to
Illinois customers.38 The Court held that Illinois could not require Bellas
Hess to collect use tax, stating that Illinois may not "impose the duty of
use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with
customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail."
Although the Court did not reference Bellas Hess when first an-
nouncing the taxation framework in 1977,40 the Court has since specifi-
cally noted that it did not overrule its holding.41 Rather, "Bellas Hess
concerns the first of these tests and stands for the proposition that a ven-
dor whose only contacts with the taxing State are by mail or common
carrier lacks the 'substantial nexus' required by the Commerce Clause.A2
Bellas Hess's holding was integrated into the taxation framework as ap-
plied in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.4 3
D. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
Twenty-five years after Bellas Hess, the Quill Court used the propo-
sition it established to create a bright-line rule.44 The facts of Quill are
the same as Bellas Hess: they "involv[ed] a State's attempt to require an
out-of-state mail-order house that has neither outlets nor sales representa-
34. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279.
35. Id.
36. Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. L. REV. 255,
268-69 (2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,
220 (1980) (internal quotations omitted))).
37. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
38. Id. at 754-56.
39. Id. at 758.
40. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 274, 279.
41. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1992).
42. Id. at 311.
43. Id
44. Id. at 317-18.
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tives in the State to collect and pay use tax on goods purchased for use
within the State.'-A
The Supreme Court of North Dakota "declined to follow Bellas
Hess because 'the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal
innovations' of the past quarter-century have rendered its holding 'obso-
lete.'"A6 While the Supreme Court "agree[d] with much of the state
court's reasoning," it declined to come to the same conclusion.4 7
The Court determined that "the continuing value of a bright-line
rule in this area and the doctrine and principles of stare decisis indi-
cate[d] that the Bellas Hess rule remain[ed] good law" and declined to
overturn Bellas Hess.48 The conviction in the Court's holding is belied by
the opinion's conclusion, in which the Court stated: "[O]ur decision is
made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is not only one that
Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress
has the ultimate power to resolve.A9
Quill was decided in 1992, the same year AOL was released for
Windows.50 At that time, Quill protected the relatively small mail-order
industry, which totaled only $180 billion. Throughout the next the twen-
ty-five years the Internet grew exponentially, and Quill's bright-line rule
now protects a $3.16 trillion industry and is causing "a serious, continu-
ing injustice" to the states.
E. Removing Precedent
When courts want to remove precedent, they have traditionally had
two options. Courts can either overrule their previous precedent or they
can call, implicitly or explicitly, for legislative intervention.52 Courts are
hesitant to overrule themselves; a high threshold must be passed in order
45. Id. at 301.
46. Id. (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991), rev'd, 504
U.S. 298 (1992)).
47. Id. at 302.
48. Id. at 317 (italics in original).
49. Id. at 318.
50. David Lumb, A Brief History of AOL, FAST COMPANY (May 12, 2015, 1:15 PM),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3046194/fast-feed/a-brief-history-of-aol.
51. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl (Direct Mktg. Ass'n III), 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134-35 (2015)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg's Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, WASH. POST
(May 20, 2007) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052900740.html; see also Richard L. Hansen, End of the
Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 205, 208
(2012); James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme
Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091, 1092 (2001).
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for this to happen.53 In order for legislative intervention to be effective,
the country must have a functioning legislature.
1. Judicial Overruling
It is not easy to overrule past precedent. "The Court has said often
and with great emphasis that 'the doctrine of stare decisis is of funda-
mental importance to the rule of law."' 54 "[S]tare decisis is a basic self-
governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with
the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurispru-
dential system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary discretion."'55 It "en-
sures that the law will not merely change erratically and permits society
to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in
the proclivities of individuals."56 Stare decisis promotes "clarity, stabil-
ity, and predictability in the law, efficiency, legitimacy, and fairness and
impartiality." 57 Courts have overruled prior decisions only "where the
necessity and propriety of doing so has been established."5 8 This practice
is rare, however, as "any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis de-
mands special justification." 59 Since its inception in 1789 until 2010, the
Supreme Court has explicitly overruled prior decisions 236 times, or
60
approximately one per year.
"The overruling of a precedent, despite its infrequen-
cy ... represents a dramatic form of legal change."6 I The Court, there-
fore, addresses myriad informal factors when determining if a precedent
should be overruled.6 2 One factor that weighs heavily is the type of inter-
pretation at play: constitutional or statutory.63 As Justice Scalia stated,
"[the Court has] long recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis has
special force where Congress remains free to alter what we have done."64
"Th[is] idea has long been advanced .. . because Congress has the power
to pass new legislation correcting any statutory decision by the Court that
Congress deems erroneous."65 "The traditional justification for this in-
formal rule is that Congress can alter an incorrectly interpreted statute by
amending it. Revisions of a constitutional decision, however, generally
53. See generally Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 52; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("We have held that any departure from the doctrine of stare deci-
sis demands special justification.").
54. Patterson, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways and Pub.
Transp., 438 U.S. 468, 494 (1978)).
55. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
56. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
57. Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 52, at 1092 (internal citations omitted).
58. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172.
59. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
60. S. Doc. No. 112-9, at 2601-15 (2016).
61. Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 52, at 1092.
62. See generally id.
63. See id. at 1103.
64. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 52, at 1094.
2017] 633
DENVER LAWREVIEW
require a constitutional amendment, and thus for most practical purposes
only the Court can change a piece of constitutional doctrine."66 There-
fore, the Court has been more reluctant to overturn statutory precedent,
assuming instead that "if the legislature does not alter the Court's inter-
pretation of a statute, and thus silently acquiesces to it, this informal
norm asserts the precedent should not be overruled."67
Not only must a precedent meet the Court's discerning eye, it must
position itself before the Court to begin with. The only court that may
overrule Supreme Court precedent is the Supreme Court itself. There-
fore, in order to reevaluate a prior precedent, the Court must grant a peti-
tion for certiorari to a suitable case. Over the past thirty-five years, the
Court's docket has dropped by 56%, from a high of 167 opinions in 1981
to 74 opinions in 2015.68 While a small docket helps create some stability
in law, the sharp decline in the Court's docket increases the burden for
being heard.
2. Legislative Overruling
When the particularities of a case do not lend themselves to overrul-
ing past precedent, the Court has historically turned to the legislature to
intervene.69 Legislative intervention is one aspect of the separation of
powers doctrine, creating a legislative check on the judicial system.70
While Congress may not explicitly overturn Supreme Court opinions, it
can create legislation that effectively nullifies Supreme Court prece-
dent.7 1 "The governing model of congressional-Supreme Court relations
is that the branches are in dialogue on statutory interpretation: Congress
writes federal statutes, the Court interprets them, and Congress has the
power to overrule the Court's interpretations."72
However, the number of laws enacted by Congress has seen a sig-
nificant downward trend since the early 1970s, falling from 772 in the
93rd Congress to 296 in the 113th Congress.7 3 In particular, the number
of overrides has fallen dramatically. Overrides have fallen "from an av-
erage of twelve overrides of Supreme Court cases in each two-year con-
gressional term during the 1975-1990 period, to an average of 5.8 over-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1094-95.
68. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based
Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 151-53 (2010).
69. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2466 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) ("The ball is once again in Congress' court to correct the error into which this Court has fall-
en.").
70. See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 518-21 (2009).
71. See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009)
(effectively nullifying the Court's opinion in Ledbetter).
72. Hansen, supra note 52, at 208; see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
73. Statistics and Historical Comparison, GovTRACK (Oct. 30, 2016),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics.
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rides for each term from 1991-2000, and to a mere 2.8 average number
of overrides for each term from 2001-2012."74
Legislative override is an important tool in our system of govern-
ment. For example, in 2007, the Supreme Court decided Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,75 a gender pay discrimination case. The
Court held that, while Ms. Ledbetter had "demonstrated that her current
pay was discriminatorily low due to a long series of decisions reflecting
Goodyear's pervasive discrimination against women managers in general
and Ledbetter in particular," her claim was time-barred.76 Justice Gins-
burg's dissent, read from the bench,77 attacked the majority for their
"cramped interpretation of Title VII" and called for legislative interven-
tion, stating, "[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress' court."78
Two years later, Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
clarifying the statute of limitations on gender pay discrimination claims
and making it easier for such claims to be brought.7 9 Through Congress,
the people spoke up and corrected the injustice they saw. This is exactly
how legislative overrides should work. As the rates of legislative over-
rides fall, "Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes are now very
likely to be final," and the people's voice within the government is likely
to become quieter.80
F. Narrowing Precedent
The Court's high threshold for both accepting a petition for certiora-
ri and overruling prior holdings, combined with a fast-paced world and
an increasingly divided Congress, has severely limited the judicial sys-
tem's ability to overturn precedent." When faced with precedent that
does not quite reach the exacting threshold required for overruling and a
Congress that is divided and deadlocked, courts lean toward a third op-
tion: distinguishing, rather than overruling, prior precedent.8 2 Distin-
guishing prior decisions narrows the impact of the prior precedent. As
cases become narrower and narrower, without any hope for congression-
al intervention, we may begin to see an increase in "precedential is-
74. Hansen, supra note 52, at 209. The rate of overrides likely fell even more dramatically
than the numbers indicate, as the 1991 term included the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a single law
which nullified ten Supreme Court cases.
75. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
76. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 659-60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
77. Barnes, supra note 52, at 1 ("The decision moved Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to read a
dissent from the bench, a usually rare practice that she has now employed twice in the past six weeks
to criticize the majority for opinions that she said undermine women's rights.").
78. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
79. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
80. Hansen, supra note 52, at 224.
81. See discussion infra Section IV.
82. See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L.
REv. 1861, 1862-67 (2014).
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lands," or cases that are binding only on their exact factual scenario.8 3
When courts are faced with precedent they cannot overrule and do not
want to apply, they narrow the past precedent, chipping away at the cov-
erage of the precedent.84 As more and more courts chip away at the edges
of a precedent, it becomes less and less applicable to cases at bar.8 5 Even-
tually, the judicial system creates a precedential island: a precedent so
narrow that it covers only its specific factual scenario. In creating these
islands, it becomes more and more difficult to find a suitable case in
which the Supreme Court can reexamine the necessity and propriety of
keeping this precedential island on the books.86
II. DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIA TION V. BROHL
A. Facts and Procedural History
In an effort to address the low rate of use tax compliance,87 the Col-
orado legislature passed a law (the Colorado Law) imposing a notice
requirement on retailers that do not collect sales or use tax when selling
to Colorado purchasers.88 The Colorado Law went into effect on Febru-
ary 24, 2010.89
The Colorado Law imposes three obligations on non-collecting re-
tailers.90 The Colorado Law imposes three obligations on non-collecting
retailers, including providing notice informing customers of their use tax
obligations.91 Failure to provide notices as required by the Colorado Law
results in fines of five to ten dollars for each failure.92
83. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring);
see Re, supra note 82, at 1867.
84. See Re, supra note 82, at 1863.
85. For example, the Court's 1944 decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
upheld the executive order creating Japanese internment camps; however, as this factual scenario has
yet to arise again, this precedent is still on the books as good law. See Adam Liptak, A Discredited




87. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d 1129, 1132 n. 1(10th Cir. 2016) (noting that the Colorado
Department of Revenue estimates "the compliance rate of remote retail sales" from retailers not
required to collect taxes at 4%. In contrast, the sales tax compliance rate is 98.3%).
88. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(11) (2017); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-1:39-21-
112.3.5 (2017).
89. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5).
90. 1 CCR § 201-1:39-21-112.3.5 (explaining that a non-collecting retailer is defined as a
"retailer that sells goods to Colorado purchasers and that does not collect Colorado sales or use
tax").
91. Non-collecting retailers must: (1) "send a transactional notice to purchasers informing
them that they may be subject to Colorado's use tax"; (2) "send Colorado purchasers who buy goods
from the retailer totaling more than $500 an annual purchase summary with the dates, categories,
and amounts of purchases, reminding them of their obligation to pay use taxes on those purchases";
and (3) "send the Department [of Revenue] an annual customer information report listing their
customers' names, addresses, and total amounts spent." Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1133
(citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)).
92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5).
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DMA is "a group of businesses and organizations that market prod-
ucts via catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, and the Internet."93
The members of DMA are non-collecting retailers and thus subject to the
Colorado Law.94 In 2010, DMA filed a suit against the Colorado De-
partment of Revenue (the Department) in federal district court, claiming
the Colorado Law discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate
commerce, thus violating the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine." The
federal district court granted DMA's motion for summary judgment and
enjoined the Department's enforcement of the Colorado Law.96 The De-
partment appealed to the Tenth Circuit.97
The Tenth Circuit held that the federal district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to hear the case, per the Tax Injunction Act98 (TIA). 99 The TIA re-
moves the federal courts' jurisdiction in cases that would "enjoin, sus-
pend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection" of state taxes.100 The
Tenth Circuit remanded the case with orders to dismiss the claims and
dissolve the injunction.iot After the Tenth Circuit denied a request for en
banc review,102 the federal district court dismissed the claims 'without
prejudice and dissolved the injunction.'03 DMA brought two subsequent
actions-a new suit against the Department in state district court and a
petition for certiorari of the Tenth Circuit's decision.'04
While the state district court rejected DMA's claim that the Colora-
do Law unduly burdened interstate commerce, it issued a preliminary
injunction based on DMA's facial discrimination argument. o0 Four and a
half months later, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari review of
the Tenth Circuit's decision.10 6 The state district court subsequently
stayed its proceedings, pending a ruling by the Supreme Court.' 07
93. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1132.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1133-34.
96. Id. at 1134 (citing Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber (Direct Mktg. Ass'n I), No. 10-cv-01546-
REB-CBS, 2012 WL 1079175, at *10-11 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012), rev'd sub nom. Direct Mktg.
Ass'n v. Brohl, 735 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015)).
97. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl (Direct Mktg. Ass'n II), 735 F.3d at 904, rev'd, 135 S. Ct.
1124 (2015).
98. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) ("[D]istrict courts shall not enjoin, suspend
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.").
99. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1134.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
101. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1134.
102. Id. (citing Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, No. 12-1175 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, No. 13CV34855, at 1, 22-23
(Dist. Ct. Colo. Feb. 18, 2014)).
106. Direct Mktg. Ass'n II, 735 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2901
(2014).
107. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1134.
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Approximately eight months later, the Supreme Court held that the
Colorado Law addressed reporting requirements not taxation and there-
fore did not fall within the TIA's definition of "assessment, levy, or col-
lection of any tax." 08 Thus, the suit was not barred from federal court by
the TIA. 109 The case was reversed and remanded to the Tenth Circuit for
further proceedings on the merits of DMA's dormant Commerce Clause
claims.no
B. Opinion of the Court
Judge Scott Matheson authored the opinion of the court.' Judge
Neil Gorsuch filed a separate concurring opinion.l 12 The Tenth Circuit
held that the Colorado Law neither discriminates against nor unduly bur-
dens interstate commerce.1 13 The court began by providing an overview
of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.1 14 It then distinguished Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, determining that the bright-line rule Quill recog-
nized is limited to tax collection."'5 Finally, the court analyzed DMA's
claims under the dormant Commerce Clause, finding neither undue bur-
den nor discrimination.'6
After briefly reviewing the history of the dormant Commerce
Clause and its proper application, Judge Matheson expressly pointed out
that the decision reached in this case "need not be final." 17 Judge Mathe-
son explained that if the Colorado Law is upheld, Congress may preempt
it with its own law; however, if the Colorado Law is struck down, Con-
gress may expressly authorize it with its own law."'8 "In that sense, the
judicial decision determines which party would need to go to Congress to
seek a different result." 1 9
1. Distinguishing Quill
As Judge Matheson succinctly stated, "The outcome of this case
turns largely on the scope of Quill." 20 Judge Matheson referenced the
numerous criticisms of Quill's bright-line "physical presence" rule, in-
cluding Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the opinion that remanded this
case.121 Justice Kennedy called Quill "a holding now inflicting extreme
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1131 (2015).
109. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1132, 33.
110. Id. at 1134.
111. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1129.
112. Id. at 1147.
113. Id. at 1134.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1147.




121. Id. at 1137.
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harm and unfairness on the States."12 2 Judge Matheson expressly pointed
out that, while never overruled, Quill has never been extended "beyond
the realm of sales and use tax," and declined to do so in this case.123
DMA argued that Quill has been cited outside the context of sales
and use tax in three separate Supreme Court opinions.124 However, Judge
Matheson quickly rejected this argument, as "these opinions merely de-
scribe points of law in Quill and do not actually extend its holding to
other contexts."1 25 He additionally cited to a Tenth Circuit case in which
the court declined to apply the Quill rule to licensing and registration
requirements imposed on out-of-state entities.126 Judge Matheson con-
cluded that Quill's bright-line rule "applies narrowly to and has not been
extended beyond tax collection" and therefore was inapposite in this
127case.
2. DMA's Claims
The lower court's opinion granted summary judgment to DMA on
their argument that the Colorado Law impermissibly discriminates
against interstate commerce and their argument that the Colorado Law
unduly burdens interstate commerce.128 Judge Matheson addressed each
in turn.
a. Impermissible Discrimination
The district court determined that he Colorado Law was discrimi-
natory because "the combination of state law[ 129] and Quill guarantees
that [the Colorado Law] applies only to out-of-state retailers."130 After
finding discrimination, the district court "subjected the law to strict scru-
tiny."13' "The court concluded the Department failed to carry its burden
on the discrimination analysis and granted summary judgment to DMA"
based on that conclusion.'32
Judge Matheson reviewed the district court's opinion de novo. First,
Judge Matheson determined that he Colorado Law does not facially dis-
criminate because the law's differential treatment is based on whether a
retailer collects sales or use tax, not whether the retailer is out-of-state. 133
Because facial discrimination is not the only manner in which a law can
122. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123. Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1137.
124. Id. at 1138.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing American Target Advert., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000)).
127. Id. at 1139.
128. Id.
129. Colorado law requires that all retailers doing business in Colorado and selling to Colorado
purchasers collect and remit sales tax. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 39-26-101 to -129 (2016).
130. Direct MAktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1140.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1141-42.
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discriminate against interstate commerce, Judge Matheson went on to
address "the direct effect of the Colorado Law."1 3 4
Turning to the direct effect of the law, Judge Matheson rejected
DMA's argument of discriminatory treatment.1 35 He first rejected
DMA's argument that Quill applies, as "Quill applies only to the collec-
tion of sales and use taxes, and the Colorado Law does not require the
collection or remittances of sales and use taxes."1 3 6 Then he rejected
DMA's claim outright, reiterating that the Colorado Law is only discrim-
inatory if it constitutes "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter and
thereby alters the competitive balance between in-state and out-of-state"
businesses. 137 The tax collection requirement on in-state retailers creates
a hefty burden. DMA did not establish that this burden was out-
weighed by the reporting requirement of the Colorado Law and, thus, the
Colorado Law has no discriminatory effect.' 39
b. Undue Burden
Even nondiscriminatory laws must not unduly burden interstate
commerce.140 When turning to the undue burden analysis, Judge Mathe-
son noted that the district court decided the issue of undue burden under
Quill's "physical presence" rule, and DMA limited its argument similar-
ly.14 1 The district court found an undue burden, "concluding that the bur-
dens imposed by the Act and the Regulations are inextricably related in
kind and purpose to the burdens condemned in Quill." 42
However, as Judge Matheson once again pointed out, "Quill is not
binding in light of the Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit decisions con-
struing it narrowly to apply only to the duty to collect and remit taxes."43
After pointing out that Quill is not controlling five more times, Judge
Matheson stated that "[b]ecause the Colorado Law's notice and reporting
requirements are regulatory and are not subject to the bright-line rule of
Quill, this ends the undue burden inquiry." 44
134. Id. at 1142.
135. Before analyzing the direct effect, Judge Matheson rejects DMA's argument that non-
adverse differential treatment between in-state and out-of-state entities violates the dormant Com-
merce Clause and its argument that the Colorado Law should be viewed in isolation. Id at 1142-44.
136. Id. at 1144.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1145.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1146.
142. Id
143. Id. at 1146-47.
144. Id. at 1147.
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3. Conclusion
The majority found no dormant Commerce Clause violation and re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment, remanding for
further proceedings consistent with its decision.145 The Tenth Circuit
concluded "by noting the Supreme Court's observation in Quill that
Congress holds the 'ultimate power' and is 'better qualified to resolve'
the issue of 'whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden
interstate retailers with a duty to collect sales and use tax[]."'l
46
C. Concurring Opinion
Judge Gorsuch wrote a separate concurring opinion "only to
acknowledge a few additional points that ha[d] influenced [his] thinking
in this case." 4 7 He acknowledged that which has thus far only been hint-
ed at: "At the center of this appeal is a claim about the power of prece-
dent."l148
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine "might be said to be an ar-
tifact of judicial precedent," and it is on the precedential power one of
"the most contentious of all dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause cases" that
the instant case rests. 149 Quill has been criticized for many years, by
scholars as well as Supreme Court justices.50 However, as Judge Gor-
such reminded, "Quill remains on the books and [the court] is duty-
bound to follow it."' 5 ' Regardless of the Court's confidence (or lack
thereof) in the decision itself, it is a Supreme Court decision that the
Court may never overrule.152
After determining that Quill must be followed, Judge Gorsuch pon-
dered "what exactly Quill requires of us."1 53 There have been numerous
interpretations of Quill, but "[m]ost narrowly, everyone agrees that
Quill's holding forbids states from imposing sales and use tax collection
duties on firms that lack a physical presence in-state." 54 The reporting
requirement imposed by the Colorado Law "doesn't go quite that far." 55
Colorado even "suggests that its statutory scheme carefully and con-
sciously stops (just) short of what Quill's holding forbids."'5 6
Judge Gorsuch went one step further and stated that he court's "ob-



























but also to afford careful consideration to the reasoning (the 'ratio de-
cidendi') on which it rests."l5 7 Judge Gorsuch emphasized that this con-
sideration is particularly important when the prior decision "emanates
from the Supreme Court."15 8 It is the consideration of the court's reason-
ing, Judge Gorsuch explained, on which DMA's argument rests.'5 9 Judge
Gorsuch summarized DMA's argument: the burdens imposed by the
Colorado Law are "burdens comparable in their severity to those associ-
ated with collecting the underlying taxes themselves."l6 0 Judge Gorsuch
disagreed with this analysis.161
When looking at the reasoning on which Quill rests, Judge Gorsuch
clarified, it has very little to do with the burden of "laws commanding
out-of-state firms to collect sales and use taxes." 62 Judge Gorsuch de-
clared that "[I]t is instead and itself all about the respect due precedent,
about the doctrine of stare decisis and the respect due a still earlier deci-
sion."l63 He concluded that it is "this distinction [that] proves decisive"
in this case.'64
In Quill, the Court decided to retain the physical presence rule es-
tablished in Bellas Hess, "but did so only to protect the reliance interests
that had grown up around it."' 65 Judge Gorsuch stated that the Quill court
went so far as the "expressly acknowledge[] that Bellas Hess very well
might have been decided differently under contemporary Commerce
Clause jurisprudence .... "166 He pointed out that "The Court also ex-
pressly acknowledged that states can constitutionally impose tax and
regulatory burdens on out-of-state firms that are more or less comparable
to sale and use tax collection duties."' 67 Judge Gorsuch determined that,
as the Quill court called the distinction between regulatory burdens and
collection burdens "artificial and formulistic," this court is "under no
obligation to extend [Bellas Hess] to comparable tax and regulatory obli-
gations."'68 He also pointed out the numerous lower courts that have held
that Quill does not apply to regulatory duties.'6 9
Judge Gorsuch went on to discuss another precedent that has "suf-
fer[ed] as highly a distinguished fate," 7 0 returning to 1922, when "the
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1148-49 ("Indeed, our court has said that it will usually defer even to the dicta (not
just the ratio) found in Supreme Court decisions.").










169. Id. at 1149-50.
170. Id. at 1150.
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Supreme Court held baseball effectively immune from federal antitrust
laws and did so reasoning that the 'exhibition[] of base ball' by profes-
sional teams crossing state lines 'didn't involve commerce among the
States." '17 As Judge Gorsuch explains, even "though it has long since
rejected the reasoning of [the case], the Supreme Court has still chosen to
retain the holding itself." 17 2 It has done so "only out of respect for the
reliance interests" that have risen up around the holding.173 "And, of
course, Congress has since codified baseball's special exemption."7 4
As Judge Gorsuch determined that Quill does not require the nulli-
fying of the Colorado Law, he looked to "whether some other principle
in dormant [C]ommerce [C]lause doctrine might."75 DMA raised the
discrimination argument, "[b]ut any claim of discrimination is easily
rejected." 76 There is no evidence that the notice and reporting burdens
on out-of-state retailers "compare unfavorably to the administrative bur-
dens the state imposes on in-state" retailers.177 "If anything, by asking
[the court] to strike down Colorado's law, out-of-state mail order and
internet retailers don't seek comparable treatment to their in-state brick-
and-mortar rivals, they seek more favorable treatment, a competitive
advantage, a sort of judicially sponsored arbitrage opportunity. ...
Unfortunately, as Judge Gorsuch pointed out, it is actually this sort
of competitive advantage that Bellas Hess and Quill create.179 While the
"mainstream of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence . . . is all about
preventing discrimination between firms[,]" the jurisprudence stemming
from Bellas Hess "guarantees a competitive benefit to certain firms simp-
ly because of the organizational form they choose to assume."so And,
while it seems antithetical to conclude that Quill requires the court to
remove this benefit, Judge Gorsuch believed it to be "entirely consistent
with the demands of precedent."'8 '
"After all, by reinforcing an admittedly 'formalistic' and 'artificial'
distinction between sales and use tax collection obligations and other
comparable regulatory and tax duties, Quill invited states to impose
comparable duties."'82 Just as the Quill court upheld the Bellas Hess rule
to protect the reliance interests that had grown up around it, this court
171. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922)).
172. Id.
173. Id.






180. Id at 1150-51.




reaffirms the outer limits of Quill, protecting the reliance interests of
state legislatures such as Colorado's who are "find[ing] ways of achiev-
ing comparable results through different means."l83
Judge Gorsuch concluded by stating, "[W]hile some precedential is-
lands manage to survive indefinitely even when surrounded by a sea of
contrary law, a good many others disappear when reliance interests never
form around them or erode over time."1 84
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Formation of Quill's Precedential Island
1. Quill Should Be Overruled
Change in this country is occurring at an exponential rate and Quill
is a perfect example of this rapid movement. The rule from Quill came
out of a world that was drastically different from today's world. Mail-
order sales was a small industry in 1992, totaling only $180 billion."ss In
the time it took for Quill to be addressed again, the fledgling area it pro-
tected had evolved into a $3.16 trillion industry.186 Brick-and-mortar
stores have seen a steady decline in foot traffic every month for the last
forty-eight months and in monthly sales for the last thirty-six months.18 7
In a 2000 Pew Research Center survey, 22% -of Americans had made
online purchases; in a 2015 Pew Research Center survey, that percentage
had increased to 79%.188 "The Internet has caused far-reaching systemic
and structural changes in the economy, and, indeed, in many other socie-
tal dimensions. Although online businesses may not have a physical
presence in some States, the Web has, in many ways, brought the aver-
age American closer to most major retailers."
As Judge Gorsuch pointed out, "if it were ever thought that mail-
order retailers were small businesses meriting (constitutionalized, no
less) protection from behemoth brick-and-mortar enterprises, that
thought must have evaporated long ago."l90 He pointed to "today's e-
commerce retail leader, Amazon, [who] recorded nearly ninety billion
dollars in sales in 2014 while the vast majority of small businesses rec-
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
186. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
187. Andria Chang, Holiday Sales Trends Heighten Brick-and-Mortar Woes, EMARKETER
(Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Holiday-Sales-Trends-Heighten-Brick-and-
Mortar-Woes/1014990.
188. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online Shopping and E-Commerce, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.pewintemet.org/2016/12/19/online-shopping-and-e-commerce.
189. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1135. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
190. Direct Aktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d 1129, 1151 n.1 (10th Cir.) (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concur-
ring).
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orded no online sales at all." 91 The pendulum has swung fully in the
other direction. Far from ensuring out-of-state retailers do not bear an
undue burden, the protection afforded to out-of-state retailers by Quill's
holding now equates to a "tax shelter."'9 2
The rationale behind protecting out-of-state retailers is no longer
applicable. Indeed, by significantly reducing state tax revenue, the hold-
ing in Quill is not just out-of-date, but "a serious, continuing injustice
faced by Colorado and many other States."'93
2. Quill Will Not Be Overruled Judicially
While dormant Commerce Clause doctrine decisions appear to be
constitutional at first glance, they have significantly more in common
with statutory decisions. The rationale behind stare decisis's stronger
hold on statutory decisions arises from the ability of Congress to correct
any judicial interpretation it finds erroneous.194 This rationale applies just
as strongly to decisions under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Because the Constitution gives the power to regulate interstate
commerce to Congress, Congress has the ability to correct any judicial
interpretation under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.195 There-
fore, unlike other constitutional interpretations, Congress would not need
to invoke a two-thirds majority in Congress and garner support from
three-quarters of state legislatures to enact a constitutional amendment in
order to overrule the Court.'96 This view is further supported by looking
at Quill itself, which upheld Bellas Hess's dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine ruling, but overturned its Due Process Clause ruling.'97 In doing
so, the Court noted, "[W]hile Congress has plenary power to regulate
commerce among the States and thus may authorize state actions that
burden interstate commerce, . . . it does not similarly have the power to
authorize violations of the Due Process Clause."' Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine jurisprudence has many of its own idiosyncrasies; how-
ever, just as Congress can amend a statute it believes has been erroneous-
ly interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress can write a statute sanc-
tioning state legislation it believes the Supreme Court erroneously over-
turned. As such, decisions under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
are imbued with the same "special force" of stare decisis as statutory
decisions.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1150.
193. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194. Hansen, supra note 52, at 208.
195. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422-427 (1946).
196. U.S. Const. art. V.
197. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
198. Id. at 305.
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This "special force" of stare decisis alone makes it difficult to raise
Quill above the threshold required for overruling. This is where the speed
of change occurring in society throws a wrench into the system. Normal-
ly, the Court will wait for "the legal system [to] find an appropriate case
for th[e] Court to reexamine" the existing precedent.199 However, the
holding in Quill became outdated faster than the legal system could pro-
vide an opportunity for the Court to address it. The case was contentious
when it was heard, as evidenced by the eleven amicus curiae briefs filed
urging the Court to uphold Bellas Hess's rule, including DMA and the
eight amici curiae who filed briefs urging Bellas Hess's reversal, one of
whom was joined by twenty-six states' attorneys general. The Quill opin-
ion itself, while upholding Bellas Hess, expressly acknowledged "con-
temporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same
result were . . . [Bellas Hess] to arise for the first time today."200 Quill's
holding was out-of-date before its ink dried.
Because courts are loathe to apply a case in a way that comes to an
unjust outcome, the lower courts continue to narrow Quill.201 While this
may provide more just outcomes for the time being, as Quill becomes
narrower the number of cases that would be appropriate vehicles for the
Court to reconsider its overruling will diminish. With the minuscule rate
at which the Supreme Court grants certiorari review and the shrinking
number of appropriate cases, it is less and less likely that the opportunity
will arise for Quill to be judicially overturned.
3. Quill Will Not Be Overruled Legislatively
The Supreme Court called for congressional intervention in Quill's
majority opinion, stating "that the underlying issue is not only one that
Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress
has the ultimate power to resolve."202 "In this situation, it may be that the
better part of both wisdom and valor is to respect the judgment of the
other branches of government."203 The following congressional session
204enacted 610 laws. None addressed Quill.
The Tenth Circuit called for Congress to legislate over Quill in the
instant case, quoting the majority's plea in Quill. 205 While Congress rare-
ly overrules precedent, the average age of those few that Congress has
overruled in the last twenty-five years is 5 years.206 The first call for leg-
199. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 311.
201. See, e.g., Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 2015)
(declining to extend Quill to cover resale royalties provided for by California statute).
202. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318.
203. Id. at 3 18-19 (citations omitted).
204. Statistics and Historical Comparison, GovTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
205. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d 1129, 1147 (2016).
206. Hansen, supra note 52, at 252-55.
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islative intervention was placed twenty-four years ago. It has gone unan-
swered.
Since that first call, Congress has become increasingly divided. Pri-
or to 2000, the majority of legislative overrides were bipartisan.2 07 Now
"we see a new, but rarer, phenomenon, partisan overriding."208 Partisan
overrides are significantly more difficult, as they often require "an unu-
sual set of events: a president, House, and Senate majority of the same
party; a president with ample political capital; and enough crossover
votes to beat a filibuster." 209 Congress was unable to legislate over Quill
during a time when Congress enacted twice as many laws as it does to-
day and had an easier time gaining the support needed for legislative
overrides, and when Quill was at the prime age for overruling. It is un-
likely that the second call will produce different results.
4. The Island of Quill is Formed
At least some members of the Supreme Court would like to address
Quill. 210 However, it has yet to, and is unlikely to, encounter a case
properly situated to overrule Quill. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's
call to legislate in this area has remained unanswered. The Tenth Circuit
used the only option it had left: it distinguished Quill from Direct Mar-
keting, thus narrowing Quill's holding. The majority opinion states thir-
teen separate times that Quill does not apply.211 It is in this emphatic dis-
tinguishing that a precedential island is formed.
B. The Rise ofPrecedential Islands
As change in society increases at a rapid rate, precedent may be-
come outdated quicker than the courts can overrule it. Division in the
legislative branch may cause the Court's holdings to become the final
word on statutory questions. While courts scramble to prevent unjust
outcomes, the stability and predictability of stare decisis will slowly dis-
appear. Stare decisis's promise "that bedrock principles are founded in
the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals" will be broken.2 12
This is best illustrated by taking a deeper look at Direct Marketing's
procedural posture. When Direct Marketing reached the Supreme Court,
it had already been refiled in state court and the Colorado Law was pre-
207. Id. at 209.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 238.
210. See Direct Mktg Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ('The
legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess.");
see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
211. See Direct Mktg. Ass'n IV, 814 F.3d at 1134, 1136-37, 1139, 1144-47.
212. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
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liminarily enjoined.2 13 Therefore, there were two possible outcomes from
the Supreme Court's decision: the case would be barred from federal
courts and the injunction in state court would stand, or the case would
not be barred from federal courts and would be remanded to the Tenth
Circuit for a decision on the merits.
The Supreme Court's opinion is intriguing for two reasons. First,
the Court appears to like the Colorado Law. During oral arguments, Jus-
tice Scalia seemed shocked that this law is one-of-a-kind and could not
understand why other states have not taken similar measures.214 Justice
Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion stating what an injustice the contin-
uation of Quill and Bellas Hess jurisprudence has played on Colorado
and the states, an issue which had no relation to the jurisdictional ques-
tion before the Court.2 15 Upholding the Colorado Law would allow other
states to follow suit and, thus, lessen the fiscal burden placed on the
states as more and more retailers limit their presence to the Internet.
Even more interesting, though, is the rationale for remanding the
case. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's holding based on
reasoning barely mentioned in either parties' briefings; the reporting
requirements did not fall within the definitions in the TIA. DMA's main
argument was that "[c]hallenges . .. brought by non-taxpayers who con-
test neither their own tax liability, nor anyone else's, and which present
none of the elements of the prototypical TIA case, are not barred."2 16
Colorado's main argument was that because DMA was seeking "to en-
join and restrain the methods Colorado uses to assess and collect its sales
and use taxes," DMA's suit was barred.2 17 However, the Supreme Court
ultimately held that TIA did not bar federal jurisdiction because the re-
porting requirements were not part of assessment, levy, or collection as
defined under the Act.218 It went one step further and held that the words
"enjoin, suspend, or restrain" in the TIA "capture[]only those orders that
stop (or perhaps compel) acts of 'assessment, levy and collection."'
2 19
The Court did not wish to send the case back to the court that had
already preliminarily enjoined the Colorado Law. It did not want the
Tenth Circuit to be bound by Quill. By basing its holding on the inap-
plicability of the TIA, the Court gave the Tenth Circuit an out. The em-
phatic statement hat the Colorado Law was not a part of tax assessment,
levy or collection, was all the reasoning needed to uphold the Colorado
213. Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, No. 13CV34855, at 1, 22-23 (Dist. Ct.
Colo. Feb. 18, 2014) (order granting preliminary injunction).
214. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Direct Atg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2014) (No.
13-1032).
215. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216. Brief of Petitioner at 15, Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015) (No. 13-1032).
217. Brief ofRespondent at 13, Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015) (No. 13-1032)
(emphasis added).
218. Direct Mktg. Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1133-34.
219. Id.at1132.
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Law. The Tenth Circuit was now free to distinguish Quill, which only
applies to taxation, and find that the Colorado Law did not offend the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The Court shaped its unanimous
opinion in a way that provided the outcome the nine Justices wanted.
Instead of being "founded in the law," as promised by stare decisis, this
case turned on "the proclivities of individuals."22 0
CONCLUSION
While the precedential island of Quill is, at this time, unique, the
systematic factors that led to its creation are not. If the pace of the mod-
em world increases, precedent will become outdated more quickly and
more frequently. If the American public, and thus the legislature, be-
comes more divided, the ability of Congress to correct statutory interpre-
tations will diminish. If the country's population grows and the number
of petitions for certiorari increases, the percent of petitions the Court
hears will decrease. Even if the Court disagrees with or wishes to clarify
a precedent, the judicial system may move too slowly for an appropriate
case to come before the Court. If these systematic factors remain, Quill,
now a solitary island, may find itself with neighbors.
On December 12, 2016, the Supreme Court denied DMA's petition
for certiorari.221 As Justice Kennedy stated, this "case does not raise this
issue in a manner appropriate for the Court to address it." 222 But will
there ever be an appropriate case? If states continue to legislate around
Quill, following in Colorado's footsteps, the Court may never have a
chance to address Quill. Some may argue that this is exactly how prece-
dent is supposed to function: that a precedential island forms and then,
over time, the sea of certainty washes it away and it disappears. But if
times change too quickly and the islands form too rapidly, it may be that
the sea of certainty will disappear instead.
KRISTINL. ARTHUR
220. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
221. Direct Mktg Ass'n v. Brohl, 2016 WL 4565072, at *1 (2016) (denying petition for certio-
rari).
222. Direct Mktg Ass'n III, 135 S. Ct. at 1135 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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